Not sure from that what your point is, t_E. Are you still arguing the occupation should continue, or have I misread you?

No, I'm saying it looks like an opportunity to end the occupation without leaving a humanitarian disaster in its wake. The only part I disagree with are the parts where the author refuses to acknowledge the role of counterinsurgency in enabling it to happen. Can you imagine Sunni and Shia coming together to work with the Americans to root out al Q while we were stuffing abu Ghraib to the gills with indiscriminate, neighborhood round-ups of combat age males? (Odierno's MO when he was commander of the 4th Infantry Division, incidentally).

In the first section, Dreyfuss almost seems to be complaining that we're not fighting enough, as if that were the goal of counterinsurgency, while any recently published book on counterinsurgency will tell you that fighting amounts to about 10% of the effort at most. It's a consistent blind-spot for Robert Dreyfuss that (like the US military before 2006) he can't tell the difference between piling up corpses in a conventional war, and winning the trust of the civilian population in an unconventional one. They're like night and day to each other, but its all one big lump to Robert Dreyfuss.

Aside from that, I agree with Uberdog: sounds like an astute analysis.

Well jeez o pete, even religious psychosociopaths get tired of turning their living environment into a dying hell.

They're fucking tired, and the USA is fucking tired, and even Iran next door is fucking tired.

Osama is fucking tired.

That's all. (edited to correct: that's probably the main part. mea culpa) Our revamped counterinsurgency tactics have had whatever effect they've had, but it is only magical thinking to attribute coincidence to cause and effect. Maybe they helped. Maybe they helped a little or a lot. We honestly *don't know*.

But we *know* that our troops are fucking tired. We know the Iraqis were tired early on, purple fingers or not. The extrapolation therefrom is obvious and a bridge of logic much less far than that of 'our counterinsurgency is working, yea, much to our surprise'.

So you can imagine Sunni and Shia coming together to work with the Americans to root out al Q while we were stuffing abu Ghraib to the gills, setting up special abuse-a-detainee tents where troops could try their hand at amateur interrogation techniques, etc., etc.?

What we *know* will become clearer in time, when people start paying attention to the actual conduct of the war.

Sorry, gotta catch a plane. I'll check in later.

quote:

Originally posted by the_Etruscan:
No, I'm saying it looks like an opportunity to end the occupation without leaving a humanitarian disaster in its wake. The only part I disagree with are the parts where the author refuses to acknowledge the role of counterinsurgency in enabling it to happen. Can you imagine Sunni and Shia coming together to work with the Americans to root out al Q while we were stuffing abu Ghraib to the gills with indiscriminate, neighborhood round-ups of combat age males? (Odierno's MO when he was commander of the 4th Infantry Division, incidentally).

In the first section, Dreyfuss almost seems to be complaining that we're not fighting enough, as if that were the goal of counterinsurgency, while any recently published book on counterinsurgency will tell you that fighting amounts to about 10% of the effort at most. It's a consistent blind-spot for Robert Dreyfuss that (like the US military before 2006) he can't tell the difference between piling up corpses in a conventional war, and winning the trust of the civilian population in an unconventional one. They're like night and day to each other, but its all one big lump to Robert Dreyfuss.

Aside from that, I agree with Uberdog: sounds like an astute analysis.

Dreyfuss him said:

quote:

If so, that's perverse. The fact is: There is a critical window of opportunity opening for the United States to withdraw and for Iraq to hold itself together and rebuild. To the extent that things are getting better, that's good news.

And this Dreyfuss ain't the actor. Or did we know that and the reference was a joke?

Anyway, where is it that he "refuses to acknowledge the role of counterinsurgency in enabling it to happen"?

Sorry he failed to bolster your preferred hypothesis in *his* article, but that's hardly a refusal much less a rebuttal or, heaven forfend, a refutation. Perhaps he hardly feels it's worth mentioning that once we stopped being fuckheads they were willing to finally try us on as genuine partners, this perhaps being too bloody obvious to bother acknowledging, presumably after years of telling us that being bloody fuckheads a la abu et al was NOT the way to go about it.

He does say:

"That happy funeral is the result not of brilliant U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, but of the determination of our newfound Sunni allies to exterminate the group."

but as I recall, it was the Sunnis themselves who started that action, rather to our delighted surprise, whereupon the (8ahem*) brilliance of Our New Counterinsurgency Strategy was to go along with this unique happenstance of the War in Iraq actually turning, for a brief golden moment, into an actual battle with Al-Q.

So for once we didn't shit all over those we were supposed to be liberating when they themselves proved more adept than us at liberating themselves from the quagmire we imposed upon them.

So we actually stopped pouring gasoline on fire, and instead supplied waterhose to the locals.

I think Mr. Dreyfuss has a point indeed when he gives credit for Sunni resistance to the various tinders of civil war and not to those agents who ignited the dang thing in the first place.

So we stopped acting like assholes and they stopped working with assholes of at least similar language and skin tone to eliminate invading assholes of foreign language and skin tone?

I ask us: *WHOSE* counterinsurgency is THAT?

quote:

Originally posted by kenmeer livermaile:
I ask us: *WHOSE* counterinsurgency is THAT?

I'll give you a hint: not the insurgent's.

quote:

Originally posted by the_Etruscan:

quote:

Originally posted by kenmeer livermaile:
I ask us: *WHOSE* counterinsurgency is THAT?

I'll give you a hint: not the insurgent's.

Axioms as hints are easy to follow but lack a certain subtlety as befits a hint..

quote:

So you can imagine Sunni and Shia coming together to work with the Americans to root out al Q while we were stuffing abu Ghraib to the gills, setting up special abuse-a-detainee tents where troops could try their hand at amateur interrogation techniques, etc., etc.?

To paraphrase Rumsfled:

'The absence of blatanly counter-effective methods on our part is not evidence of the presence of effective methods on our part.'

So we finally stopped declaring War on Iraqis. We stopped being the insurgents. I call that not counter-insurgency but apostate insurgency.

By the way, o by now high-flying wigber, I do realize that a) I am being unjustifiably truculent with you and b) my point is not as strong as the vigor with which I present it.

My way of pointing out that the same is true of your assessment of Dreyfuss' article.

quote:

Originally posted by the_Etruscan:
No, I'm saying it looks like an opportunity to end the occupation without leaving a humanitarian disaster in its wake. The only part I disagree with are the parts where the author refuses to acknowledge the role of counterinsurgency in enabling it to happen. Can you imagine Sunni and Shia coming together to work with the Americans to root out al Q while we were stuffing abu Ghraib to the gills with indiscriminate, neighborhood round-ups of combat age males? (Odierno's MO when he was commander of the 4th Infantry Division, incidentally).

In the first section, Dreyfuss almost seems to be complaining that we're not fighting enough, as if that were the goal of counterinsurgency, while any recently published book on counterinsurgency will tell you that fighting amounts to about 10% of the effort at most. It's a consistent blind-spot for Robert Dreyfuss that (like the US military before 2006) he can't tell the difference between piling up corpses in a conventional war, and winning the trust of the civilian population in an unconventional one. They're like night and day to each other, but its all one big lump to Robert Dreyfuss.

Aside from that, I agree with Uberdog: sounds like an astute analysis.

I'd have to go back and read it again, but a lot of the points you made about the article seemd to come from Dreyfuss' frustaration plus exasperation. Which isn't to say he is missing the counter-ins. point, but I think maybe he's missing accidnetally rather than by being ignorant of counter-ins. doctrine.

Also, do we have a successful model of counter ins. in a war of late?

We ditched the Kurds in Gulf One, Grenada nd Panama weren't heavy into counter ins. as I recall, Bay of Pigs was amess and Vietnam was piling up more bodies while trying to win H&M.

Perhaps he thinks that we aren't capable of doing effectively and is dismissing the possibility that it is actually working for a change.

Oh, wait, it worked well in Afghanistan, but I suppose that was mure insurgency support than caounter-ins. since we weren't fighting on the Soviet's side.

Reading Dreyfuss led me to begin contemplating what an end to the war in Iraq might look like.

How might the war close? How might Iraq fare?

What will the fall out be in Aerica?

What would be a "Win?"

And so on.

I personally hope it ends with "poo-tee-weet?", but I doubt it.

I see dead people.

I see Iranian women throwing rose petals at the feet of our victorious hero-soldiers as they are liberated from their self-determination and oil wealth; I see them throwing their headscarves and dignity to the wind when they realize they can make more money selling stuff if they're wearing less clothes and an inane grin than making sound arguments for the value of the services and goods they offer.

And the insurgency of Iraq miraculously ending when the Shia devils learn to fear the big pointy stick of the crusader armies.

quote:

the_kenmeer:
Anyway, where is it that he "refuses to acknowledge the role of counterinsurgency in enabling it to happen"?

"Surge or Not, Things Are Getting Better"

Surge Not, Things Are Getting Better, Not

quote:

Sorry he failed to bolster your preferred hypothesis in *his* article, but that's hardly a refusal much less a rebuttal or, heaven forfend, a refutation.

Here I must point out that the current state of US counterinsurgency doctrine is not my idea, nor is it a hypothesis: it's theory and practice, as you can see.

Not that I don't have my own preferred hypothesis about how it might fit into the larger scheme of defusing this infernal "Clash of Civilizations" we seem to be sliding towards. See Giuliani working the wounds of 9/11 to his advantage. Instinctive, knee-jerk reactions always get a rise, that's why defense has traditionally been a trump card in the Republican deck. Meanwhile, the first rule of counter ins. strategy is to resist the instinct to reflexive retaliation in favor of a more calibrated response. If these principles were better understood, Giuliani could not knee-jerk the American public--amplifying the desired effect of the terrorist spectacle through his fear-mongering--without appearing to be a dupe on a string held by Osama. But what is the Democrat's response? what is their alternative? I honestly don't know, but I can imagine it skewing far to the right in the event of another spectacle on US soil (to the continued profit of military industrial interests, SIGINT being so much more lucrative than HUMINT).

We're on the wrong track strategically (instinctively) and it can only get worse with climate change without a significant course correction. And I'm speaking of the US public here; 3,000+ dead and 40,000+ maimed makes counter ins. an expensive lesson for the military, but strategic goals must be communicated across the social spectrum to the extent the whole spectrum is involved--now more than ever.

quote:

Perhaps he hardly feels it's worth mentioning that once we stopped being fuckheads they were willing to finally try us on as genuine partners, this perhaps being too bloody obvious to bother acknowledging, presumably after years of telling us that being bloody fuckheads a la abu et al was NOT the way to go about it.

That would hold more weight if Dreyfuss had endorsed the alternative, or even admitted one existed, but as I recall, he spoke out loudly against the surge (whereas now he's only grumbling softly against it). But where you say it's "hardly worth mentioning" "too bloody obvious to bother acknowledging" is where I wholly disagree.

On one side of the aisle, the Republicans can't get into it because that would mean owning up to a litany of outrages committed on their watch: the "do and say anything at all" in the name of force protection policy--things that would drive any sensible person to take up arms against us. While on the other side, the Dems have positioned themselves as the staunchest critics of surge in exchange for a short-sighted surge in the polls. To go back on it now would be admitting that General Betray Us was not, in fact, breaking faith with people of Iraq, although he may have risked the lives of our precious troops in the process (which is the proper role of an all volunteer military toward a defenseless civilian population, if you ask me). And over it all hangs this notion that our precious troops can do no wrong: the neurotic legacy of the Vietnam era, reiterated like a mantra, has the effect of preempting any close examination of the actual conduct of the war outside the Green Zone, where journalists once feared to tread. No, I'd say this conversation has not yet begun. [/hypothesis]

quote:

He does say:

"That happy funeral is the result not of brilliant U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, but of the determination of our newfound Sunni allies to exterminate the group."

but as I recall, it was the Sunnis themselves who started that action, rather to our delighted surprise, whereupon the (8ahem*) brilliance of Our New Counterinsurgency Strategy was to go along with this unique happenstance of the War in Iraq actually turning, for a brief golden moment, into an actual battle with Al-Q.

So for once we didn't shit all over those we were supposed to be liberating when they themselves proved more adept than us at liberating themselves from the quagmire we imposed upon them.

Of course they're better at liberating themselves--that's the whole point: success is measured in hearts and minds, not corpses [smacks self in forehead]. The goal here is to make common cause with the people of Iraq. What, I ask you, is the point of pitting the strategy against the strategic goal? To portray it as an either/or dichotomy is kind of misleading, don'tcha think?

from The New Yorker:

quote:

I asked Zaidan what sort of deal had led to the Sunni Awakening. “It’s not a deal,” he said, bristling. “People have come to realize that our fate is tied to the Americans’, and theirs to ours. If they are successful in Iraq, it will depend on Anbar. We always said this. Time was lost. America was lost, but now it’s woken up; it now holds a thread in its hand. For the first time, they’re doing something right.” ...

quote:

kenmeer:
I think Mr. Dreyfuss has a point indeed when he gives credit for Sunni resistance to the various tinders of civil war and not to those agents who ignited the dang thing in the first place.

I understand his point.

quote:

Mr. Zaidan continues:
... “We’ve already taken our revenge,” he said. “We’re the ones who’ve made them crawl on their stomachs, and now we’re the ones to pick them up.”

I think the NYer article makes clear how culturally ill-suited (ethnocentric) we yanks are for this line of work. Everything about it runs counter to our culture, intuition and military training. But, anecdotally, I think the article also indicates how, in our hamfisted American way, the effort is being made in good faith.

Not that it's time to crow like a rooster and unfurl the Mission Accomplished banner again. That would be the undoing. Lao Tse, for instance, was speaking in terms of counter ins., in the Tao Te Ching, when he advised leadership to treat victory as a funeral. We have much else to atone for in Iraq, but the fact that we toppled Saddam, instead of the Iraqis themselves, remains the primary indignity.

Alexander [spoken through an interpreter]: How would you have me treat you?

Poros: As a king.

Alexander: That much I would do out of respect for my own honor, but ask for something more...?

Poros: That will be enough.

quote:

By the way, o by now high-flying wigber, I do realize that a) I am being unjustifiably truculent with you and b) my point is not as strong as the vigor with which I present it.

Likewise; It goes w/out saying.

quote:

Originally posted by UberDog:
I'd have to go back and read it again, but a lot of the points you made about the article seemd to come from Dreyfuss' frustaration plus exasperation. Which isn't to say he is missing the counter-ins. point, but I think maybe he's missing accidnetally rather than by being ignorant of counter-ins. doctrine.

Maybe, but I doubt it; see hypothesis.

quote:

Also, do we have a successful model of counter ins. in a war of late?

We ditched the Kurds in Gulf One, Grenada nd Panama weren't heavy into counter ins. as I recall, Bay of Pigs was amess and Vietnam was piling up more bodies while trying to win H&M.

Perhaps he thinks that we aren't capable of doing effectively and is dismissing the possibility that it is actually working for a change.

Oh, wait, it worked well in Afghanistan, but I suppose that was mure insurgency support than caounter-ins. since we weren't fighting on the Soviet's side.

You raise a good point, insurgencies have failed--the Sandinistas were crushed time and time again until they finally found the right formula--but as long as they remain in the fight, time is generally on their side. Whereas counterinsurgency, OTOH, seems to be a doctrine informed by trial and error, but mostly by error.

Which is just to say that 'counter insurgency' means anything you throw at an insurgent, but traditionally and historically favoring the iron fist: curfews, disappearances, goon squads, torture. Which is why I hate to keep saying "counterinsurgency, counterinsurgency" all the time, for lack of a better term. ...I think the old fashioned term for winning hearts and minds was "chivarly."* Not that I'm an authority on the subject by any stretch--I can't tell you more than Wikipedia ... the British were effective in Malaysia--but I have the distinct impression that the trial balloon for the current model of COIN ops is Iraq.**


*Saladdin's parting gift to the crusaders departing Jerusalem--their lives; the full amnesty granted by Mohammad to his enemies on capturing Mecca; the famous clemency of Cyrus the Great, whose example Alexander paid closer attention than he ever did to his tutor Aristotle: the Middle East not only speaks the language of chivalry, they practically invented it.

**based largely on lessons learned and promptly forgotten from Vietnam: The Vietnam debacle was studied extensively by PhD candidates like Petraeus, but buried in the earth like Cain buried Abel by planners in the Pentagon. "We have finally put the Vietnam Syndrome to rest." - Geo. H.W. Bush

quote:

Originally posted by UberDog:
Reading Dreyfuss led me to begin contemplating what an end to the war in Iraq might look like.

How might the war close? How might Iraq fare?

What will the fall out be in Aerica?

What would be a "Win?"

And so on.

Good question. I'd define a win as atonement for our arrogance in the estimate of the Moslem world--but most of all for the introduction of AQ into a country where they once feared to tread. The least we can do is take al Q in Mesopotamia with us when we leave; remove the accelerant to sectarian friction and let 'em sort out the rest. But the worst we can do is to allow sectarian violence to jump the border and spark a region wide, Islamic Wars of the Reformation.

quote:

I personally hope it ends with "poo-tee-weet?", but I doubt it.

That would sure be nice.

quote:

a0 Anyway, where is it that he "refuses to acknowledge the role of counterinsurgency in enabling it to happen"?

b) "Surge or Not, Things Are Getting Better"

That's acknowledgment. Just not endorsement. hHings are getting better, he says. And he allows that the surge might be part of that. But he doesn't give it prime credit.

I like that, mahseff.

quote:

a)Sorry he failed to bolster your preferred hypothesis in *his* article, but that's hardly a refusal much less a rebuttal or, heaven forfend, a refutation.

b) Here I must point out that the current state of US counterinsurgency doctrine is not my idea, nor is it a hypothesis: it's theory and practice, as you can see.

The hypothesis I mean is that the theory and practice you mention must be given credit and that not doing so is somehow wrong.

quote:

a) Perhaps he hardly feels it's worth mentioning that once we stopped being fuckheads they were willing to finally try us on as genuine partners, this perhaps being too bloody obvious to bother acknowledging, presumably after years of telling us that being bloody fuckheads a la abu et al was NOT the way to go about it.

b) That would hold more weight if Dreyfuss had endorsed the alternative, or even admitted one existed, but as I recall, he spoke out loudly against the surge (whereas now he's only grumbling softly against it). But where you say it's "hardly worth mentioning" "too bloody obvious to bother acknowledging" is where I wholly disagree.

Perhaps the part of the surge he spoke out loudly against was the surge part, wherein tired troops were returned to what at the time was a Waring blender?

Perhaps we should distinguish between 'send in more troops' and 'do things differently'? Is this something he failed to address during his years of covering the war? Perhaps he had no more faith in Petraeus than in P's predecessors who also promised to turn corners via professed counterinsurgency techniques?

I agree that not being fuckheads is a topic of merit, but I can also throughly understand why someone in Dreyfuss' position would not bother mentioning it... after loudly denouncing our former 'counterinsurgency/victory' strategy (or lack thereof) since probably before the war commenced?

Or did he not do this in previous rants on the topic?

This message has been edited. Last edited by: kenmeer livermaile,